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Abstract    
Experimental evolution has yielded surprising insights into human history and evo-
lution by shedding light on the roles of chance and contingency in history and evo-
lution, and on the deep evolutionary roots of cooperation, conflict and kin discrim-
ination. We argue that an interesting research direction would be to develop 
computational and experimental systems for studying evolutionary processes that 
involve multiple layers of inheritance (such as genes, epigenetic inheritance, lan-
guage, and culture) and feedbacks (such as gene-culture coevolution and mate 
choice) as well as open-ended niche construction—all of which are important in 
human history and evolution. Such systems would also be a clear way to motivate 
evolution and computation to scholars and students across diverse cultural and so-
cioeconomic backgrounds, as well as to scholars and students in the social sciences 
and humanities. In principle, computational models of cultural evolution could be 
compared to data, given that large-scale datasets already exist for tracking cultural 
change in real-time. Thus, experimental evolution, as a laboratory and computa-
tional science, is poised to grow as an educational tool for people to question and 
study where we come from, why we believe what we believe, and where we as a 
species may be headed. 
Human history in light of experimental evolution 
Can evolution experiments help at all in the interpretation of human population 
genomics and history? Surprisingly, in some cases the answer may be yes. 
Reports that a small number of powerful men, possibly including Genghis Khan, 
have fathered millions of male descendants have garnered much attention in the 
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popular press [1-3]. It seems that warlords with astounding reproductive success 
have left their footprint on the evolutionary record as well as history [4]. What is 
truly surprising however, is that similar evolutionary dynamics occur during the 
exponential growth of spatially structured populations of cells, such as in biofilms, 
tumors, and developing embryos—in the absence of natural selection. The key 
mathematical connection is that the distribution of offspring among people is heavy-
tailed, such that some people are born into notably large families. The same goes 
for lineages of cells that are growing exponentially in spatially-structured popula-
tions. 
Heavy-tailed offspring distributions in expanding populations can 
cause fictitious selection pressures 
In a series of elegant theoretical and experimental investigations, Oscar 
Hallatschek and colleagues have shown that in expanding bacterial colonies 
founded by a clonal ancestor, the number of descendants per bacterial cell has a 
heavy-tailed distribution. Surprisingly, selection-like biases emerge, in which com-
mon lineages tend to produce more “jackpot” mutations that track lineages with a 
large number of descendants [5-7].  Independently, Christina Curtis and colleagues 
have reported ‘big bang’ expansions of highly successful clonal lineages in tumors 
despite the absence of selection, again due to a heavy-tailed offspring distribution 
caused by population growth [8]. 
These experiments have broader lessons for the genomics of human populations, 
which are also spatially-structured and have been expanding rapidly for thousands 
of years [9]. First, population expansion amplifies the effects of stochastic sampling, 
including mutational jackpot events. Second, such purely stochastic fluctuations can 
mimic dynamics caused by selection, and have thus been termed “fictitious selec-
tion” [6]. When one zooms out from human history, past the proximate causes of 
events such as the Mongol conquest, the distribution of human Y-chromosome hap-
lotypes appears to be driven largely by chance, or by historically contingent epige-
netic factors such as culture and technology, rather than heritable genetic factors. 
Cooperation and kin discrimination has a deep evolutionary 
basis 
Another important parallel with human history and evolution found in evolution 
experiments is the universal importance of cooperation and kin discrimination. Mi-
crobes often produce public goods, such as extracellular enzymes that break down 
resources such as sucrose [10] or environmental toxins such as hydrogen peroxide 
[11]. For that reason, microbes have evolved a variety of mechanisms to distinguish 
3 
kin from unrelated strains. Evolution experiments and studies of the natural history 
of microbes show that kin discrimination is an ancient social trait, pervasive within 
and between bacterial populations, species, and communities. Some bacterial strains 
stab different bacterial strains to death (“contact-dependent killing”), which causes 
different strains of bacteria to “phase separate”, promoting increased cooperation 
among related strains [12]. Discomfiting parallels with “ethnic cleansing” during 
many civil wars and genocides are evident. 
Bacteria are also capable of sacrificing themselves for the good of their kin. “Su-
icide bomber” bacteria produce toxins that are costly to produce but disproportion-
ately lethal to unrelated toxin-sensitive strains. By freeing up resources for their kin 
to use, suicidal altruistic behavior is evolutionarily stable in spatially-structured 
populations of bacteria, as the benefit to kin outweighs the cost to individual cells 
[13]. In human cultures, martyrdom and self-sacrifice for the common good is cen-
tral, and are common elements in religions and political ideologies (“give me liberty 
or give me death!”). Furthermore, the basis of organized warfare is the commitment 
of individual soldiers to altruistically sacrifice for their fellow soldiers and the com-
mon good—although in practice this often amounts to the spoils of war or access to 
greater power or wealth in a patronage network. 
Experiments with the remarkable social bacterium Myxococcus have shown that 
strains evolved from a common ancestor can rapidly evolve to distinguish each 
other [14]. In this system, kin discrimination evolves despite the absence of direct 
selection pressures for that trait, but rather as a side-effect of adaptive evolution to 
their environment. There is a striking parallel to how human language evolves. Lan-
guage is crucial not just as a communication medium but also as a marker of cultural 
belonging and social status. Languages, isolated for long enough, gradually evolve 
to become mutually unintelligible, and thus can become the basis for kin discrimi-
nation, even in the absence of direct selection pressures for mutual unintelligibility. 
Can runaway niche construction lead to ecological suicide? 
Another recent surprise is that soil microbes can change the acidity of their en-
vironment rapidly enough to drive laboratory populations to extinction, a phenom-
enon called “ecological suicide” [15]. In another evolution experiment, Michael 
Travisano and colleagues found increasing rates of population crashes and instabil-
ity over the course of bacterial adaptation to a stressful environment [16]. Such dy-
namics may not be constrained to niche construction or ecological change either. In 
the context of sexual selection, Hanna Kokko has discussed how selection for male 
reproductive success could result in characteristics harmful to females, and how 
intense male-male competition could exert costs on females that harm the success 
of the population as a whole, maladaptively driving a population closer to extinction 
[17]. 
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These sorts of dynamics are clearly relevant to human populations. Humans are 
masters of niche construction---altering their own and other species’ local environ-
ments and thereby transforming natural selection pressures---attested to by agricul-
ture, city construction, and highly technological forms of warfare, all of which could 
plausibly lead to ecological suicide. Indeed, terms like “anthropogenic climate 
change” and “nuclear winter” succinctly demonstrate the scale of humankind’s in-
fluence on the natural environment, and thus their social environments. The ecolog-
ical changes wrought by industrialization are obviously maladaptive in the long-
term, given how trillions of dollars of infrastructure lies on coastlines vulnerable to 
sea-level rise, and our dependence on ecosystems that are vulnerable to ocean acid-
ification. 
Changes in culture, technology, and society are having dramatic effects on the 
course of evolution on the planet, in particular by accelerating the pace of extinction 
of natural species, replacing natural habitats with agricultural, industrial, and urban 
development, and through global changes to the nitrogen and carbon cycle. Will 
those changes in turn cause moderating feedbacks on human society and behavior? 
We hope so. Recent work by Daniel Rothman estimates that the amount of carbon 
required to trigger a catastrophic mass extinction is roughly that projected to be 
produced by humanity around the year 2100 [18]. An open question is whether 
global civilization—itself a complex adaptive system—will be able to adapt on a 
short enough timescale to avoid catastrophe [19]. 
Calibrating our intuitions by comparison to evolution 
experiments 
An interesting premise in teaching evolution to students is to compare timescales 
for evolutionary change in human populations to the timescales of evolutionary 
change in laboratory experiments. We can come up with a rough comparison with 
reference to Richard Lenski’s long-term evolution experiment [20]. Lenski’s exper-
iment involves 12 populations of Escherichia coli, founded from a common ances-
tor 30 years ago, that each have been evolving in isolation for 70,000 bacterial gen-
erations. Each day, 1/100 of each population is diluted into fresh growth media. So, 
each population goes through log2(100) doubling each day, or ~6.6 bacterial gener-
ations. Each bacterial population roughly has an effective population size of 
5,000,000 bacteria, which is the bottleneck that occurs during the transfer into fresh 
growth media. If we assume that one human generation takes 30 years, then each 
day of Lenski’s experiment represents about 200 years of human evolution.  
In each replicate population, beneficial mutations occur, increase in frequency, 
and compete for eventual establishment. A natural timescale for evolution in this 
experiment is the time that it takes for a beneficial mutation to occur and establish 
in the full population. This is known as a “fixation” event, because then all future 
individuals in the population have that beneficial mutation fixed in their genomes. 
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This is also called a “selective sweep”, because the beneficial mutation sweeps out 
all genetic variation found in competing strains. 
In one population of this long-term experiment, the time for the first selective 
sweep was 2,500 generations, although large changes in gene frequency occur 
within 500 generations. Translating into human generations, this represents 75,000 
years for a selective sweep (2,500 generations), and 15,000 years for an equivalent 
large change in gene frequency (500 generations). 
One caveat with this comparison is that in clonal populations of bacteria, selec-
tive sweep can be prolonged by competition between beneficial mutants [21-23]. In 
a separate experiment with budding yeast in which sexual recombination was an 
experimental treatment [24], an early selective sweep took about 300 generations to 
complete. Again assuming 30 years for one human generation, this represent 9,000 
years. We emphasize that these estimates are crude at best: in an evolution experi-
ment with sexual recombination and adaptation from pre-existing genetic variation, 
Kosheleva and Desai found that population fitness increases in the absence of com-
plete selective sweeps [25].   
Are these crude estimates at all relevant to human populations? As a rough check, 
we can compare these numbers to current estimates of the time passed since the 
most recent common ancestor for mitochondrial DNA (mitochondrial Eve) and all 
Y-chromosome haplogroups (Y-chromosomal Adam). Estimates for the time 
passed since  mitochondrial Eve is 99,000-148,000 years ago or 3300-4940 gener-
ations, and 120,000-156,000 years or 4000-5200 generations for the time passed 
since Y-chromosomal Adam [26]. These estimates are consistent with the recent 
African origin of modern humans before a series of migrations out of Africa from 
~50,000 to ~135,000 years ago [27]. 
In contrast, linguistic and cultural change occurs far more rapidly. As a historical 
comparison, 10 generations is 2 days for bacteria in Lenski’s experiment, and 300 
years for humans. In 1718, the world population was ~600,000,000 people. 100 
generations is 15 days in Lenski’s experiment, and 3000 years for humans. 1000 
BCE is around the time of the Late Bronze Age collapse, and the world population 
was ~50,000,000 people. 1000 generations is 151 days of evolution in Lenski’s ex-
periment (5 months), and 30,000 years for humans. 28,000 BCE was the Upper 
Paleolithic, and world population was ~2,000,000 people. In short, for cultural and 
linguistic change to effect genetic change through selection, social norms have to 
be sustained over an extremely long time. Currently, the few social norms that seem 
to have been sustained long-enough to provoke genetic evolutionary change through 
selection are those that aided survival during the thousands of generations that hu-
mans lived as bands of hunter-gatherers and, more recently, those related to the 
settlement of humans into either herding or sedentary lifestyles after the invention 
of agriculture and animal husbandry during the Neolithic revolution ~10,000 years 
ago [28]. 
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Comparison of timescales for demographic change and admixture 
In contrast to the timescale for selective sweeps, evolutionary change due to recom-
bination, gene flow, migration, and admixture between populations occurs on faster 
timescales. Even though these processes dominate bacterial evolution in nature [29, 
30], so far few experimentalists have studied them in the lab [24, 25, 31-33]. The 
dynamics of migration and admixture are central to human history, evidenced by 
population genomics and breakthroughs in the sequencing of ancient DNA from 
archaeological and fossil remains [4]. For instance, significant admixture has oc-
curred in the Americas in the past 500 years, due to waves of voluntary and forced 
migration [34]. The arrival of Europeans in the Americas resulted in the rapid de-
cline of Native American populations, due to the importation of Old World plagues 
such as smallpox and measles [35]. In much of the Americas, natives were enslaved 
by Europeans and compelled to work on plantations. When those natives died due 
to overwork, poor nutrition, and lack of resistance to Old World diseases, slaves 
from Africa were imported as replacement labor, leading to sometimes novel, some-
times recurring admixture among various Native American, European and African 
populations. Strict racial hierarchies were put into place in Spanish, Portuguese, 
French and British colonies based on different degrees of European descent (i.e. 
[36]). This history has left a strong imprint on contemporary culture in the Ameri-
cas: contemporary social and political order, as in the past, is largely based on race 
and degrees of European descent [37]. This fact is the basis of many contemporary 
political pathologies in the United States. For instance, it is possible that one reason 
why funding for public education and healthcare has been cut over and over again 
in the past decades, is spiteful political motivations driven by anxieties over race. 
Later in this paper, we discuss such issues in the context of cultural and institutional 
evolution. Feedbacks between demographic change and cultural and institutional 
evolution remain an important topic for future research that is highly relevant to 
contemporary politics and policy. 
Non-genetic modes of inheritance in humans obey evolutionary 
dynamics 
There are obvious limitations to mapping the dynamics of human history and 
evolution onto evolution experiments. Genetic evolution is slow, and while social 
dilemmas and public goods games have been studied extensively in evolution ex-
periments [38-40], genetic evolution has little to do with everyday social dilemmas 
in which community welfare is at odds with individual incentives [41], or in social 
dilemmas in which particular groups profit from the exclusion or oppression of 
other groups at the expense of overall welfare. Nevertheless, the social tools that 
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humans have to deal with social dilemmas such as racism and climate change them-
selves are subject to evolutionary dynamics that operate on much faster timescales: 
language, behavior, culture, and symbolic communication [42]. This occurs because 
languages, behaviors, cultures, and symbolic communication are transmitted across 
human generations (they are heritable), they vary within and across populations 
(phenotypic variation), and different variations may spread faster, be copied or im-
itated more, or be more resilient against the invasion of other variations (selection). 
For this reason, there is significant conceptual overlap between historical issues that 
come up in the social sciences and in evolutionary biology and computation. We 
discuss some of these conceptual overlaps next. 
Conceptual overlaps between evolutionary experiments and 
computation with social science 
Gene-culture coevolution is important in human history and 
evolution 
That we have culture and symbolic communication is in part dependent on a 
series of genetically evolved characteristics [43]. In turn, culture can alter the course 
of genetic evolution through niche construction [44]. The challenges of everyday 
life in the past has honed a species that is both capable of aggressively seeking in-
dividual gain as well as banding together to solve collective action problems. An-
cestors with a greater ability to coordinate and therefore address collective problems 
had an evolutionary advantage over those who did not [45, 46]. Coordination has 
biological prerequisites, such as the ability to estimate the intentions of other actors, 
and remember an approximate accounting of others’ past behavior, both collabora-
tive [47] and antagonistic [48]. Facial recognition and emotional interpretation, for 
example, are of tremendous help in developing and navigating complex societies. 
In turn, cultural innovation has over hundreds of thousands of years played a role in 
genetic innovation. For instance, hominids such as Homo habilus and Homo erectus 
were able to make sophisticated stone tools that probably helped them survive in 
their environment. To give another example, the domestication of cattle, goats, and 
camels for milk in parallel across cultures imposed strong selection pressures for 
the ability to digest lactose. In this manner, genes and culture co-evolve [49].  
Similarly, does epigenetic information play any role in evolution experiments 
and computation? Although once controversial, it seems so. For example, nonge-
netic variation in the ability of bacteriophage l to bind alternative host receptors 
was important in catalyzing an evolutionary innovation in which the phage protein 
8  
evolved a qualitatively new function [50]. Interestingly, evolutionary algorithms in-
spired by epigenetic inheritance have found practical use in solving multi-objective 
optimization problems [51, 52].  
Adaptation, chance, and historical contingency in culture and 
human institutions 
 
A fundamental question in evolutionary biology is the relative roles of adapta-
tion, chance, and historical contingency (i.e. historical accident) in shaping ensem-
bles of possible evolutionary outcomes and histories. Although this question cannot 
be answered for singular evolutionary trajectories, such as the origin and subsequent 
evolution of life on Earth, evolution experiments allow replicate evolutionary his-
tories to be run and replayed, such that the contributions of adaptation, chance, and 
contingency in evolution can be teased apart [53, 54]. Adaptation, chance, and his-
torical contingency are important factors in any historical process, and for that rea-
son are highly relevant in the study of cultural and institutional change and design. 
 Institutions help define communities by organizing and transmitting information 
that affects individual phenotype and behavior through learning, imitation, and in-
culcation [43, 44]. Often, institutions turn on a deontic that allows, obliges, or for-
bids some behavior. Transgressors can expect, with some probability, a cost (the 
formal stipulation of which transforms a norm into a rule). These costs can be ex-
ternally and internally imposed, and the former begets the latter, as when—after 
years of scolding from your mother about, say, biting your fingernails—you feel 
guilty when engaging in the “offensive” behavior. In some cases, such institutions 
are good for both society and in the individual, as in prohibitions against drinking 
alcohol, smoking cigarettes, or using drugs. And in generating a regularity of human 
behavior, institutions ease communal interactions, freeing individual cognitive 
bandwidth for other tasks.  There are plenty of instances, however, where a deontic 
unduly burdens some members of society but not others, as either chauvinism or 
self-hatred in the form of overt and eventually internalized misogyny, anti-Semi-
tism, or racism. 
Inculcation can be seen as matter of operant conditioning involving rewards and 
punishment. That is, norms and rules may be transmitted through the promise of 
boosted payoffs, rewards, and warm fuzzy feelings brought on by community ap-
proval and the corresponding sense of virtuousness, or by the fear of punishment or 
sanctions. In the latter case, the teaching and inculcation process may not neces-
sarily be for the learner’s benefit, but for the benefit of the teachers, and perhaps 
(hopefully) the larger community.  One’s preferred strategy for a given game, for 
example, may require cooperation from other players and so one and one’s fellow 
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adherents have a stake in perpetuating one’s strategy through sanctioning and in-
culcation. Whether or not the spread of this strategy leads to an increase in payoffs 
for converts, or to an increase in social welfare, depends on the game. 
But where do institutions come from in the first place? Humans routinely en-
counter strategic, multi-party situations that are liable to repeat, and—as game the-
oretic folk theorems have shown—such repeated scenarios have myriad viable, sta-
ble equilibria. That one equilibrium is settled on over others in a given community 
may occur for any number of reasons. A particular strategy might be chosen because 
of what it means for linked or nested games, or because of path dependencies and 
historical trajectories (e.g., [55]), for matters of convenience, or for no particular 
reason whatsoever. Over time patterns become set, a regularity of behavior is estab-
lished among participants, and the arrangements become a tacit part of the commu-
nity, enabling individuals to (near-unthinkingly) carry out tasks without endlessly 
renegotiating what might otherwise be thorny communal issues [56]. 
By invoking a deontic—a “may”, “must”, or “must not”—norms and rules blur 
the line between prudent and proper action. Some institutions are blatantly moral, 
dealing with who gets what, and why. The crucial concept of desert—what it means 
to deserve some resource, treatment, or responsibility—is itself an emergent social 
institution [57] that can be meaningfully translated into and from the moral grammar 
of justice, and has a direct effect on the distribution of power and wealth in a society 
[58]. But by specifying acceptable, unacceptable, and obliged behaviors whose ob-
servance or violation in turn requires others to monitor, punish, and reward, even 
ostensibly pragmatic norms and rules take on a distinctly moral flavor. In their 
weakest formulation, such institutions deal with manners and niceties. Stronger for-
mulations amount to what we often call duties. 
All people have behaviors they consider crude, questionable, and taboo, polite, 
noble, and obligatory, but where any specific behavior falls among these categories 
changes across communities, sometimes drastically (e.g., [59, 60]). Deontics can 
cause institutions that arise in response to particular environmental or social chal-
lenge to become entrenched even in the absence of the original reason for that in-
stitution, such as the ceremonial monarchies that exist in many countries. Deontics 
thus create a positive feedback loop that maintains a “memory” of historical con-
ventions. Historical “memory” affects all evolving systems, since heritability is de-
fined as phenotypic correlations between past and present generations. How quickly 
does the imprint of the past decay in evolving systems? In what circumstances is 
“memory” of the past adaptive, say, as pre-adaptations to recurring conditions? And 
in what circumstances is “memory” of the past maladaptive, say, when entrenched 
beliefs or adaptations to historical conditions inhibit adaptation to present or future 
conditions? 
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Entrenchment and contingency in cultural evolution 
As a shortcut to the process of learning from direct experience in each generation, 
inherited institutions allow humans to learn about the world from others around 
them. This shortcut, however, comes at a price, namely: individuals who inherit the 
institution may not fully grasp its relationship to the problem it helped solve. Alt-
hough an obvious advantage overall, this may lead to all manner of trouble, includ-
ing the aggrandizement of the institution to sacred rather than sensible causes, and 
the misapplication of the institution to unrelated problems. We sketch out a hypo-
thetical example to illustrate our point. 
Deontics stabilize multiple equilibria in indefinitely repeated social dilemmas 
Imagine two rivers with people living along the length of each. Upstream fami-
lies can divert the river such that downstream families are forever worried about 
scarcity of the common-pool resource. Along River A, people adopt an obsequious 
demeanor when interacting with upstream families, devoting resources to currying 
their favor by delivering gifts, while the people of River B strike an aggressive pos-
ture and spend resources to maintain a credible threat of violence. Because everyone 
except the distant-most river residents has an upstream and downstream neighbor, 
both arrangements are in equilibrium, both keep the water flowing, and both require 
continued investment from all parties.1 The overall ethoses, however, are very dif-
ferent.  
The founding people of River A are in not in any fundamental way different—
friendlier or more docile—than the founding people of River B. Early generations 
devised the now dominant strategies through feedback and learning, perhaps trying 
many solutions before discovering one that stuck. The people of River A might have 
become as warlike as those along River B had someone successfully experimented 
with warfare before testing tribute and trade. People can see their neighbor’s water 
level and correlate it with that neighbor’s strategy. For an array of reasons, someone 
along River A successfully tried gift-giving before fighting, and the behavior 
spread, saving neighbors the costs of further experimentation, which may be sub-
stantial when it comes to water that one’s family needs now. Early on, the respective 
peoples of River A and B adopted friendly or antagonistic attitudes in their political 
relations. Later on, the peoples of River A and B were raised to be friendly or an-
tagonistic, at least within the context of upstream relations. 
                                                            
1 This toy example scales up easily enough, so that the cooperative residents 
along River A work to jointly manage water flow, and the truculent residents of 
River B settle into a pattern of coalition-building and warfare; a sort of balance-of-
powers, whereby various downstream neighbors ally and oppose various upstream 
groups through threat of force. 
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The crucial idea is that the first peoples used feedback from the common re-
source—water level in this case—to determine whether or not the behavior boosted 
payoffs. This is not necessarily so for subsequent generations, who become indoc-
trinated into the initial behavior. Early generations of the people alongside Rivers 
A and B learned that upstream gift-giving or threat-making led to a stable water 
flow. Following generations may have noticed the association between water level 
and gift-giving or threat-making, but what they definitely learned was that failure 
to observe gift-giving or threat-making norms resulted in dirty looks and other sanc-
tions from their family members. Entering as they are into an equilibrium with the 
payoff of a reliable water flow, they may never directly observe the strategy’s rela-
tionship with the resource. Early generations knew they were amiable or hostile 
toward upstream people to keep the water flowing. Following generations know that 
they are amiable or hostile to avoid reprimand from others in their community. For 
both generational classes, the actors are looking to avoid a decrease in payoffs. In 
the former, that decrease primarily comes from competition over the resource. In 
the latter, the decrease may partly come from the resource, but foremost in peoples’ 
minds are decreases through communal-sanctioning and self-sanctioning. Institu-
tional economists often refer to these cost as external and internal delta parameters, 
respectively. 
What was at first a narrow, prudent aim has been replaced by a broad, moral 
imperative. Niceness along River A and nastiness along River B are over time less 
valued for their effectiveness at maintaining water levels and are increasingly asso-
ciated with the community’s identity and character, valued in and of itself as subse-
quent generations perpetuate the norm that they were raised to. Such are the benefits 
and costs of inheriting an equilibrium rather than forging it: one learns a lesson, but 
not the original incentive for it. You know you are supposed to be nice or mean to 
the neighbors upstream, without the knowledge of why. You never went without 
water for lack of being nice or mean. You just got yelled at by your parents. You 
inherit the strategy, but not the thirst that originally motivated it. 
As in our example, cross-cultural psychologists find that the ethos of a commu-
nity is deeply tied to the biophysical environment and natural resources that sustain 
it. For example, cross-cultural psychologists have found evidence that people from 
pastoralist lineages are more prone to violence that are people descended from farm-
ing communities [61] and cultures dependent on rice cultivation appear to be more 
interdependent than those that grow wheat [62]. A key difference between these 
cases and the hypothetical example we give is that one of a multiplicity of equally 
plausible solutions can become culturally entrenched over time, without the need 
for greater collective cooperation in one over the other, as is required to grow rice 
compared to wheat. On top of showing that a common biophysical environment can 
lead to widely divergent dispositions toward cooperation between populations, our 
hypothetical scenario further illustrates how a seemingly pragmatic, non-normative 
institution can grow in scope and cultural importance through the untethering of 
deontic from the problems their institutions evolved to address. 
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Exaptation in cultural evolution 
Once its initial aim become obscure over time, we suspect that inherited institu-
tions will often outlive the problem they evolved to address. In our upstream/down-
stream example, it is easy to see how deference and aggressiveness may change 
from behavioral strategies into communally-valued traits. Institutions addressing 
particularly salient problems like water supply are wont to be especially dogged, 
with early generations firmly implanting the behavior, and the tools for its future 
observance, in their children. It is no great leap, then, to see that beliefs strongly 
reinforced by the community yet mentally untethered from their raison d’etre might 
be repurposed and applied to any number of problems. Or, if not directly applied to 
new problems, they may be thought of as appropriate behavior in new scenarios to 
no benefit beyond the aforementioned role of all institutions in generating social 
regularity and clear interpersonal expectation, and possibly even to individual and 
communal detriment. 
Secondary contact in cultural evolution 
In addition to being used in novel scenarios, inherited institutions may be applied 
in the same setting but with a twist: contact with another group that has evolved a 
different solution to the problem in question. If River A and River B turn out to be 
two distant sections on a very long river, the peoples from each may eventually 
encounter one another. As observers of this hypothetical clash of cultures, we may 
root for the success of one over another, but from the narrow perspective focused 
on continued water flow, the spread of either the fawning (pacific) or assertive (ag-
gressive) culture will suffice. Rather than a rational comparison of the two equilib-
rium-inducing solutions to the downstream problem, though, conflict may arise as 
a matter of identity, with River A and River B people vying not just for the spread 
of their downstream solution but for the spread of what that solution has become: 
their morals and communal character. The story of their encounter, however, may 
not be a violent clash. The fundamental alteration to the social environment, once 
incorporated into the evolutionary game, means that the process may yield a whole 
new equilibrium wherein both cultures are transformed.  
Migration and emigration between populations surely plays an important role in 
cultural evolution, as it does in genetic evolution. Understanding how cultural dif-
ferences causes permeable barriers to admixture, say due to taboos in marriage 
across class, race, caste, or community lines, and how genetic admixture or (lack 
thereof) plays a role in cultural evolution is poorly understood and ripe for study.   
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Future directions and possible contacts with the social sciences 
Evolution experiments can only have contact with the social sciences insofar as 
data from both fields fit the same classes of mathematical models. This is occasion-
ally possible because both fields share a common toolkit in evolutionary game the-
ory and dynamical systems, as well as a common interest in the evolution of coop-
eration and pro-social behavior [63-71]. Despite the attention given to prisoner’s 
dilemmas, scholars in the social sciences have taken seriously Long’s (1958) [72] 
observation that humans—and all social animals—participate in a diversity of 
games, studying reciprocity, cooperation, and trust in a variety of scenarios, includ-
ing hawk-dove [73], stag hunt [74, 75], public goods [76], and common-pool re-
source settings [77].  Similar questions have also been asked in the context of both 
the evolutionary biology of social behavior and more narrowly, in the context of 
evolutionary experiments with microbes and computer algorithms [38, 78, 79]. 
There are also other key points of overlap between the evolutionary and social sci-
ences. In both populations and social organizations, the distribution of phenotypes, 
behaviors and strategies are shaped by the environment (natural selection or sexual 
selection in populations versus conformity and economic payoffs in social organi-
zations) but a diversity of non-harmful or less-than-optimal phenotypes often per-
sists. In both populations and in social organizations, there is often a delay between 
environmental change and adaptation, causing an evolutionary mismatch [80] such 
that phenotypes, behaviors and strategies outlive their environment. 
The key difference between the social sciences and the study of genetic 
change in evolution, is the importance of transmissible epigenetic information and 
niche construction in the evolutionary dynamics of human culture [49, 81]. Culture 
is contingent on evolved traits that allow the capacity for language and intergener-
ational memory [43] and in turn culture can directly change short-term evolutionary 
dynamics by affecting probabilities of survival and reproduction [44, 49]. Hence, 
for evolution experiments and computation to have sustained relevance to the social 
sciences, model systems with dynamics that depend on both epigenetic inheritance 
as well as genetic inheritance, niche construction, and feedbacks between epigenetic 
inheritance and genetic inheritance (for example, mate choice) are needed. What 
questions may be worth asking? We sketch some possible directions below. 
How do institutions, technological and ethical norms, and social 
conventions evolve or change over time? 
A fascinating open question is how ethical norms perpetuate and change over 
time, and how they might affect how social organizations adapt to fluctuating or 
changing environmental conditions. Ehrlich and Levin [82], correctly in our opin-
ion, propose that studying the dynamic interplay between individual behavior and 
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normative rules may be key in understanding sudden phase transitions that can 
change the cultural landscape. In the face of ongoing climate change and the lack 
of political will to confront the ecological crisis, few questions are more important 
for civilization to survive the next 1000 years.  
Such phase transitions in social and ecological systems often manifest as tipping 
points. Recently, Damon Centola and colleagues [83] reported evidence of a tipping 
point in an experimental system studying social coordination. In this work, a critical 
mass of a committed minority of participants (~25%) was required to flip the state 
of an arbitrary naming convention. 
Ehrlich and Levin [82] have hypothesized that predominantly vertically trans-
mitted norms, like ethical values, are “sticky” or “highly viscous” in how they flow 
over time in an evolving population. How might such viscosity affect tipping points 
in social systems? We suggest that sticky norms might cause delays in system 
change in response to rapid environmental change. That is because ethical beliefs 
imply behavioral obligations that make them self-enforcing: such norms perpetuate 
through external costs imposed by individuals on others who violate the norm (i.e., 
sanctioning) and through internal costs that individuals who violate the norms im-
pose on themselves (i.e., inculcation, which leads to guilt and is likely built on the 
expectation of sanctioning). On the other hand, sticky norms might cause institu-
tions, cultures, and societies to remain robust in the face of temporary threats from 
rivals or temporary environmental disturbances such as natural disasters. More in-
triguingly, Simon Levin [84] has proposed “mutual coercion, mutually agreed 
upon” as a workable solution to avert tragedies of the commons, such as climate 
change. To that end, better ethical norms may be an essential part of solving public 
goods problems at scale. 
Why are institutions, laws, and morals often asymmetrical in their 
application? 
It is commonly taken for granted today that laws and codified rules should be 
applied without regard to race, gender, sexual orientation, class, or ability. Not all 
rules are formal, however, and plenty of rules on the books are not rules in practice. 
Regarding those that are, there are nonetheless strong asymmetries in their applica-
tion. This observation, that many institutions actively propagate white supremacy 
or the oppression of women is the basis for critical race theory [85] and feminist 
legal theory [86]. Examples of asymmetrically applied moral principles include 
“drug addicts deserve to be treated as criminals,” which was a common belief during 
the heroin and crack epidemics in the 1980s that predominantly affected black pop-
ulations in the U.S., but is starting to shift now that the ongoing synthetic opioid 
epidemic is predominantly killing white populations in the U.S. 
Ironically, one of the causes of the synthetic opioid epidemic is the symmetric 
application of the position that “selling addictive drugs to satisfy foreign demand is 
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acceptable” by Chinese pharmaceutical companies, and by the market system more 
broadly. Chinese modern history begins with the Opium Wars, in which the British 
waged war against China in order to sell opium to the Chinese to maintain a favor-
able balance of trade. Certainly, Chinese companies selling Fentanyl to the U.S. are 
aware of both the consequences of their actions as well as the historical irony in 
applying a moral rule symmetrically. 
On the basis of first principles, the inconsistent application of moral and legal 
principles is a contradiction. But from the perspective of institutions and morals 
arising from a process of cultural evolution, asymmetry emerges naturally, espe-
cially from the perspective of kin discrimination. Such a perspective, however, is 
descriptive (i.e. what happens in the world) and not prescriptive (the way things 
ought to be) since an evolutionary perspective on institutions and legal principles 
would necessarily concern itself with their consequences (i.e. norms and beliefs 
change in response to their outcome) rather than with justice as an immutable, uni-
versally defined concept. Put differently, students of evolution have much to say 
about morals if they approach desert and related concepts, including justice, as 
emergent social institutions rather than inborn predispositions or metaphysical con-
structs, as dominant psychological and philosophical camps contend [57, 58, 87] 
Rather than something that simply exists, justice can be meaningfully approached 
as something we create. 
How does ecological inheritance affect evolutionary and social 
outcomes? 
It is a truism that the ability of a population of organisms to survive and repro-
duce depends on their ecological context. Consider a population of populations, in 
which some subpopulations occur in environments with a higher carrying capacity 
than others. Naively, it would seem that given proportionate migration, organisms 
in better environments (say with higher carrying capacity) would have higher fit-
ness—even in the absence of any genetic determinants—than those in worse envi-
ronments. Ecological conditions can also be heritable, such as for organisms that 
hold territory and engage in niche construction. To our knowledge these questions 
have been little studied in the context of evolution experiments with microbes and 
on the computer.  
Certainly, ecological inheritance must play some important role in both cultural 
evolution and niche construction in humans as well as diverse organisms in the nat-
ural world. For instance, differences in economic capital between individuals tends 
to amplify over time due to the exponential growth of capital. These issues are 
highly relevant in contemporary society. In a widely reported study, Raj Chetty and 
colleagues reported that conditioning on parental income, wealth and privilege is 
far more heritable for white men than black men in the United States. This result is 
driven by differences in wages and employment status; notably these differences do 
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not occur between white and black women [88]. Widening economic inequality in 
the United States is a serious social issue: rates of social mobility in the United 
States has dropped from ~90% for children born in 1940 to ~50% for children born 
in the 1980s. This result is robust to many economic assumptions; furthermore, in-
creasing GDP growth rates (“growth-friendly policy” or “trickle-down economics”) 
cannot restore mobility rates to that experienced in the 1940s. In contrast, changing 
the distribution of growth across income groups to the more equal distribution ex-
perienced by the 1940 birth cohort would reverse more than 70% of the decline in 
social mobility [89]. Moreover, rising economic inequality fosters the subversion of 
legal, political, and regulatory institutions by the wealthy and politically powerful 
for their own benefit [90]. 
Positive frequency-dependent selection and multiple equilibria in 
social systems 
A key dynamic affecting the adoption of social norms is the presence of multiple 
steady states or equilibria maintained by positive frequency-dependent selection. 
For instance, in the United States people drive on the right-hand side of the road, 
while people in the United Kingdom drive on the left-hand side of the road. Follow-
ing the dominant norm in each country is strongly advised. Switching is possible, 
but only with en-masse coordination, as was done by Sweden on Högertrafikom-
läggningen (“The right-hand traffic diversion”) in 1967. As another example, 
switching from an economy based on fossil fuels to one based on carbon-neutral 
energy sources is necessary but difficult due to the costs of social coordination. 
Positive frequency-dependent selection, caused by a need for social coordina-
tion, also occurs in microbial systems. For instance, Olaya Rendueles and col-
leagues [91] found pervasive positive frequency-dependent selection among iso-
lates from a centimeter-scale population of the social bacterium Myxococcus 
xanthus. Strains that were poor competitors at intermediate frequencies were com-
petitively dominant at high frequencies. Rendueles et al. further demonstrated that 
positive-frequency-dependent selection maintains diversity in patchily distributed 
populations, suggesting that positive frequency dependence contributes to Myxo-
coccus diversity by reinforcing social barriers to cross-territory invasion and pro-
moting within-group relatedness. Surely, such dynamics need to be investigated 
more fully in evolution experiments with microbes and on the computer, given its 
relevance in both natural populations as well as for social behavior in general. 
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Do key innovations ever play a role in evolutionary rescue? 
In the absence of any political will to adequately respond to ongoing climate 
change, one hopes for some sort of “Hail Mary” gambit, such as an improbable 
technical innovation like nuclear fusion that makes a fossil-fuels-based economy 
obsolete without political or economic sacrifice. 
Evolution experiments have serendipitously become model systems for the study 
of key innovations in evolution [92, 93]. Can key innovations destabilize equilibria 
caused by positive-frequency dependent selection? Do key innovations ever rescue 
populations from extinction, say caused by ecological change or environmental deg-
radation? Perhaps these questions could be answered with the right microbial sys-
tem, or on the computer. 
Stochasticity in cultural evolution for rapidly expanding 
populations 
As we have discussed earlier, recent research shows that stochastic events have 
unexpectedly large effects on the evolutionary fates of expanding populations. 
Might the same be true for cultural evolution during the adoption of alternative so-
cial norms? We hypothesize that under conditions of expanding populations, sto-
chastic choices in which norms are chosen early in time can have large evolutionary 
outcomes (at least on a timescale of tens of generations), because initial conditions 
due to random chance can be amplified. In analogy to the results found in experi-
ments with bacterial colonies and tracking tumor growth in model systems, we pre-
dict that this is a purely 'neutral' outcome that from a dynamic point of view may 
masquerade as selection. Perhaps a real-world example might be the adoption of 
western dress (i.e. business suits) across much of the global business world. 
To what extent does epigenetic and ecological inheritance account 
for trait heritability? 
An important scientific problem today, is that estimates of the heritability of 
traits (i.e. regression of a trait between offspring and parents) could be confounded 
by the effects of heritable but non-genetic factors, such as local environment (such 
as air or water pollution), epigenetic effects such as maternal effects [94], wealth 
(including access to quality healthcare or education), and culture. For example, 
Feldman and Ramachandran [95] show that incorporating cultural inheritance into 
models for the determination of phenotypes sharply reduces estimates of the genetic 
contribution to heritable phenotypes. Given that researchers have built, and will 
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continue to build, models of the contribution of genetics to intelligence, children’s 
educational achievement, and economic and political preferences, neglecting cul-
tural inheritance and heritable differences in capital and social status would clearly 
cause serious problems. Importantly, the magnitude of cultural effects can be com-
parable to the magnitude of genetic effects [95]. 
Models of trait heritability including epigenetic sources of inheritance stand as a 
potential, non-mutually exclusive alternative to the recently proposed ‘omnigenic’ 
model for the genetic basis of complex traits [96] in order to explain why genome-
wide association studies have largely failed to explain the basis for human disease 
susceptibility. 
What role does spite play in climate change, niche construction, 
economic markets, and public goods games? 
In the context of evolutionary game theory, spite is defined as a suffering a cost 
in order to exact a larger cost on someone else. For example, a population of organ-
isms that produces an environmental toxin at some cost can still benefit if the toxin 
kills off sensitive competitors [13]. It is possible that to some degree, resistance to 
action to mitigate climate change might be spiteful. That is, if the consequences of 
climate change are largely foisted on other nations or geopolitical enemies, then the 
costs facing some nations could be offset by the benefits of hurting competing na-
tions and interests. Notions of ecological justice [97], are highly relevant here, since 
often particular cultures, ethnic or racial groups suffer disproportionately from ex-
ternalities such as pollution produced by competing interests. 
Spite is certainly relevant to public goods games [84] but more work needs to be 
done to understand the degree to which it affects the management of the global 
commons, such as the oceans and atmosphere, which are already vulnerable to trag-
edies of the commons. We propose that spite in fact plays an important role, given 
how the U.S., a major carbon polluter, has withdrawn from the Paris Climate Ac-
cords as part of its ‘America First’ policy despite global opprobrium. 
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Conclusion 
Evolution experiments with microbes and computer programs have proven to be a 
powerful paradigm for studying general evolutionary processes and dynamics 
important in ecology, evolutionary biology, computer science, and engineering. 
Here we argue that evolution experiments also shed light on processes traditionally 
studied by the social sciences. Given the substantial overlap in both mathematical 
and conceptual tools across fields, we believe that empirical and theoretical progress 
in each can inform and inspire progress in the other. A key difference between fields 
is the importance of evolutionary processes that involve multiple layers of 
inheritance (such as genes, epigenetic inheritance, language, and culture) and 
feedbacks (such as gene-culture coevolution and mate choice) as well as open-ended 
niche construction in the social sciences. Many of these topics are highly active 
research areas in evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In particular, we 
believe that computational models of niche construction may allow for the open-
ended evolution that continues to be a goal in computational evolution experiments. 
Furthermore, biological and computational experiments that are tied to phenomena 
in the social sciences may be an exciting way to motivate evolution and computation 
to scholars and students across diverse cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds, as 
well as to scholars and students in the social sciences and humanities. Given mass 
surveillance of citizens over social media and the internet by corporations and 
governments, computational models of cultural evolution in principle could be 
compared to data, given that large-scale datasets already exist for tracking cultural 
change in real-time. Thus, experimental evolution, as a laboratory and 
computational science, is poised to grow as an educational tool for people to 
question and study where we come from, why we believe what we believe, and 
where we as a species may be headed. 
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